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Although liberal moralist theories have never fully tackled it, the dirty-hands 
problem has always been taken into account in the tradition of political realism. 
From Machiavelli’s Prince, this problem has forced philosophers to deal with the 
‘irrationality of the world’ (in Weber’s terms) and to appreciate the distinction 
lying between purely moral and political domains.  
Richard Bellamy, then, is not the first theorist who confronts himself with this 
issue, when he claims that (1) it can be correctly approached only in a realist 
tradition that does not plan to sanitize politics and that (2) democracy puts some 
strong constraints on the Prince’s available dirty actions. However, whereas 
Bellamy rightly points out the failure of moral idealism at imposing a single 
conception of justice as a frame of the political debate, he does not give a 
convincing account neither of the two consequences of such a failure nor of 
democracy’s specificity in successfully constraining the Machiavellian Prince.  
In this paper I claim that the reasons of these shortcomings depend on three 
considerations Bellamy seems to overlook. First of all, he gives an ambiguous 
account of democratic hypocrisy, since the same hypocrisy that he regards as an 
intrinsic flaw of moral idealism turns out to be one of the major strengths of a 
realist democracy. Second, he includes within a democratic system a patronizing 
conception of politicians who know and pursue the public interest better than 
the citizens who elected them. I suggest that this sort of conception is highly 
controversial and inconsistent with any thorough conception of democracy. 
Finally, I claim that Bellamy’s problems stem from his unspecified conception, in 
this article, of what is distinctively ‘political’ in democratic political life. 
  
